

THE GREEN GUIDE - and deviations from it when applied to the Hillsborough Stadium				
GREEN GUIDE RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLIANCE	DETAIL OF DEVIATION	EFFECT	COMMENT & NOTES
Outside the Stadium				
Provide sufficient access routes to the stadium to assist in directing supporters to their designated viewing area.	x	There was one enclosed entry route that could hold 5,000 persons. 24,256 Liverpool supporters had to enter this area to access the stadium.	A singular access route caused all Liverpool supporters to be condensed in one area.	By contrast, Nottingham Forest had two, none-enclosed access points that ran the entire length of two sides of the stadium.
Turnstiles should be of such a number to avoid congestion.	x	From the 83 turnstiles at the ground, 23 were designated to admit 24,256 Liverpool supporters.	Insufficient number of turnstiles increased pressure on admissions.	28% of the total number of turnstiles were given to admit 45% of the total capacity.
Admission rates should not exceed 750 persons per turnstile per hour.	x	The required turnstile admission rate at the Leppings Lane End was 1,443 persons per turnstile per hour. The guideline is exceeded by double.	Admission rates averaged 660 per turnstile per hour, leaving a sizeable amount of supporters still awaiting admittance at kick-off.	HSE stated: "The longest delays likely to occur at the Leppings Lane End; particularly long delays would be likely to be experienced by those with tickets for the West terraces. We would therefore expect larger crowds to form outside the turnstiles in Leppings Lane.
The Concourse				
Signposts should be apparent to assist in directing supporters to their designated viewing area.	x	Above the tunnel leading to the central pens was the signpost 'STANDING'. There were no conspicuous signposts to the two other entrances.	Poor signposting led to over-filling of the central pens and under-filling of the wing pens.	The letter B was also above the tunnel entrance, matching the information on all 10,100 Leppings lane terrace tickets. Graham Makrell conceded that ticket information was "dangerous" because it encouraged everyone to go down the tunnel.
Stewards should be deployed to guide and assist supporters.	x	No stewards were deployed on the concourse.	With no directive to do otherwise, supporters continued to enter the central pens.	Mackrell admitted that because the club did not employ stewards to direct supporters, it was "inevitable" that the central pens would become overcrowded.
Tunnel slope should have gradient of 1/10.	x	The tunnel slope was 1/6; much steeper than recommended.	It was difficult for supporters to go back through the access tunnel.	The tunnel was the only exit route available from the central pens.
Condition Of Terrace				
A terrace step should not be less than 280mm or more than 380mm wide.	x	28 of 33 steps in the central pens did not comply with guidelines.	The safe leaning crowd model now altered.	Toppling forces affected by altered number of spectators on single step.
The ideal height of barriers is 1.1m.	x	In Pen 3, four out of five did not conform. In Pen 4, six out of nine did not conform.	Barriers below the prescribed height were ineffective.	HSE stated: "There is evidence to show that, depending on the density of the crowd, a low barrier allows a body to bend over the barrier, passing the force it is subjected to, to those in front. This action could make low barriers largely ineffective.
The recommended distance between barriers is between 1.1m and 1.4m.	x	In Pen 3, four out of five did not conform. In Pen 4, nine out of 10 did not conform.	Excessive numbers of supporters could form between barriers.	One gap was 57% wider than recommended.
The maximum horizontal distance between barriers is 3.9m.	x	In Pen 3, one spacing did not conform. In Pen 4, two spacings did not conform.		
The alignment of gaps in successive rows of barriers on a terrace should not form an angle of more than 60 deg to the barriers.	x	In Pen 3, two out of four gaps did not conform. In Pen 4, one gap did not conform.		It was quite clear that the barriers failed to break up the crowd pressure as recommended.
Every spectator should be no more than 12m from an exit.	x	The only official exit from the central pens was the access tunnel.	Insufficient number of exit points.	40% of supporters in the central pens were more than 12m from safety.
Gates and gangways should be provided and have a minimum width of 1.1m.	x	The 2 perimeter gates were both narrower than prescribed and there were no gangways in the central pens.	Insufficient exit routes from the central pens.	Lord Taylor said: "The exit routes were wholly inadequate for rescue purposes."
Gates or access points should be stewarded so that immediate access to the playing area can be ensured.	x	No stewards were deployed by the gates.	No visual monitoring of pens by SWFC.	Stewards could not perform one of their core duties: "to raise alarm" in event of an emergency.
Calculating Capacity Criteria				
54 persons per 10m ² of terrace is the recommended guide for calculating the capacity.	x	The central pens were 380m ² . 54 x 380m ² = a capacity of 2,051 persons. However a figure of 2,200 was applied.	Capacities of central pens over-estimated by 9%.	The club's safety advisors used a drawing, provided by the club, showing the central pen area to be 400m ² . Capacity should have been 2,162 but a figure of 2,200 was applied.
Deduct structures to calculate useable terrace size.	x	The useable terrace space of central pens, minus space of structures, was just 255m ² . At 54 persons per m ² the correct capacity = 1,374 persons.	The 2,200 figure is now 60% over estimation.	It was likely that all the pens' capacities had been over-estimated. "The result was that an excessive number of tickets were sold over the safe capacity." (Stuart-Smith Scrutiny)
If the terrace is in a poor condition, by deviating from the guide, a figure of 27 persons per m ² should be used to calculate the capacity.	x	The terrace deviates from the guide in almost every respect. 27 x 255m ² allows for a combined capacity of just 929 persons for the central pens.	More than 3,000 supporters were estimated to be in the central pens, in excess of three times the correct and safe capacity.	Contrary to the guide, there was no count system to prevent capacity figures for each area being exceeded. Exceeding the capacity figure contravened section 2.3 of the Safety Certificate.